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 The New Face of Political Islam in Central Asia: The Rise of Islamo-democrats 
 
  Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis 
Political Islam in Central Asia is currently undergoing a transitional phase. 
Radical groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir no longer 
monopolize the Islamist scene. There is now a new generation of Islamist leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan that advocate a public role for Islam without 
seeking regime change. They can be called Islamo-democrats because they 
participate in elections and recognize the constitutional process. The article will 
examine and compare the biography, political career and beliefs of three 
representatives of this political trend:  Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, Bekbolat Tleukhan, and 
Mohiddin Kabiri. It will claim that the emergence of Islamo-democrats is partly the 
result of developments in Turkey, especially the rise to power of the AKP. Two factors 
account for the Turkish influence in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan: the 
successful diffusion of ideological norms and the importance that governments attach 
to maintaining good relations with Turkey.  
 
Central Asia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Islam, democracy 
 
Introduction 
Political Islam in Central Asia has long been synonymous with clandestine 
groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir. It has 
been viewed and treated as a revolutionary force seeking the overthrow of the existing 
order. Therefore, Central Asian governments have taken political, legal, and security 
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measures to counter the threat perceived to be coming from these Islamists.1 
However, political Islam in the region is a much larger movement which now includes 
a new component, the Islamo-democrats.  
The term political Islam describes a transnational social movement that seeks 
to mobilize Muslims into political activities. It is a diverse and non-hierarchical 
collectivity of different actors who share some ideas and perceptions. The term 
Islamism refers to the ideology and practices of parties, groups and prominent 
individuals that claim that Islam is applicable to every aspect of life. It is a fluid and 
unsystematic set of beliefs that is open to change and adaptation in accordance to 
local conditions.  
The article will argue that there is a new generation of Islamist leaders in 
Central Asia that ought to be studied. Tursunbai Bakir Uulu in Kyrgyzstan, Bekbolat 
Tleukhan in Kazakhstan, and Mohiddin Kabiri in Tajikistan share a modest Islamist 
agenda, while they publicly pronounce their commitment to the existing political 
order. As it will be found, their democraticness does not necessarily mean acceptance 
of liberal values (e.g. gender equality). It is rather defined as participation in elections 
and recognition of the constitutional process. 
For the purpose of analysis, the article will examine and compare the 
biography, political career and beliefs of the three politicians. Furthermore, it will 
claim that this new variant of political Islam is the result of larger developments in the 
Middle East, namely the political and ideological power of the AKP in Turkey. This 
research will be partly based on interviews conducted with Kabiri (2005, 2012) and 
Bakir Uulu (2011). Since it was not possible to arrange an interview with Tleukhan, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Mariya Y Omelicheva. 2007, “Combating Terrorism in Central 
Asia: Explaining Differences in States' Responses to Terror”, Terrorism and Political 
Violence 19: 3 (July): 369-393. 
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the author used YouTube videos of him as a source of information about his beliefs. 
Additionally, the article will rely on speeches, statements and media interviews of the 
three politicians. 
 
The early political Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia 
Although Soviet Central Asia had remained relatively isolated from the rest of 
the Muslim world since the 1920s, the region was exposed to Islamism. Martha Brill 
Olcott has documented the existence of clandestine Salafi study groups in the 
Ferghana Valley during the 1970s and 1980s.2 Moreover, despite Soviet efforts to 
prevent a spillover effect on Central Asia, the resistance of the Mujahedin in 
Afghanistan served as an example for some local Islamists.3  
Following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, a wave of Islamic activism 
was unleashed in the newly established Central Asian republics. Hundreds of mosques 
were built or restored; copies of the Quran and other Islamic literature were brought in 
from abroad; and foreign imams came to preach their version of Islam.4 Initially, the 
former communist political elites did not oppose the growing religiosity of the 
population because it was seen as a means to foster patriotism. Yet, there was a 
political element that either they choose to ignore or oversee. 
                                                 
2 See Martha Brill Olcott. 2007. “Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia”, Carnegie 
Papers 77 (January), At http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/01/17/roots-of-radical-
islam-in-central-asia, accessed November 1, 2015.  
3 Jiayi Zhou. 2012. “The Muslim Battalions: Soviet Central Asians in the Soviet 
Afghan War”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25: 3 (September): 325. 
4 On the Islamic revival in Central Asia see Abdujabar Abduvakhitov. 1993. “Islamic 
Revivalism in Uzbekistan”. In Dale F. Eickelman, ed., Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: 
New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; 
Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko. 1994. Islam in Central Asia. Reading: 
Ithaca Press; Adeeb Khalid. 2007. Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in 
Central Asia. Berkley: University of California Press. 
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Tajikistan was the first Central Asian republic to experience an Islamist-led 
insurgency. The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was founded in November 
1991 with the implicit aim of establishing an Islamic republic. In response to 
government repression, the IRPT together with the other parties formed the United 
Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1993. Then the opposition forces moved to Afghanistan 
and begun launching hit-and-run attacks against pro-government militias. In June 
1997, finally, the UTO and the Tajik government agreed a cessation of hostilities.5 
Following the end of the Tajik civil war, the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir became 
the leading Islamist groups in the region. The two groups have followed very different 
paths: the IMU is a jihadi group that was established in Afghanistan by Uzbek 
Islamists to overthrow their country’s regime but is now located in Pakistan’s tribal 
areas, whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir is a international organization that has managed to 
spread its message across Central Asia with the help of grassroots propaganda.  
Yet, both of them have failed to transform themselves into massive 
movements capable of establishing an Islamic state in Central Asia. As a result of a 
security crackdown, thousands of their members currently serve long sentences in 
prisons and their activities have clearly decreased in Central Asia. While Hizb ut-
Tahrir has remained active in most of Central Asia, the declining numbers of arrests 
possibly indicate that the group is not expanding anymore. The IMU has not staged 
any attacks on Central Asian soil since September 2010, when it was involved in an 
attack against a Tajik army convoy.6 Moreover, the IMU has gone through a process 
                                                 
5 On the Tajik civil war see Suchandana Chatterjee. 2002. Society and Politics in 
Tajikistan in the Aftermath of the Civil War. London: Greenwich Millennium Press. 
6 “Tajik Officials Say Former Rebel Involved in Deadly Attack on Army”, RFE/RL, 
September 23, 2010, At 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Officials_Say_Former_Rebel_Involved_In_Deadl
y_Attack_On_Army/2166586.html, accessed October 10, 2015. 
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of ideological transformation in recent years as a result of its migration to Pakistan; 
consequently, it has become less Uzbek-oriented and has opted for a local jihad. 
There is an extensive literature on political Islam in Central Asia during and 
after the Soviet period. A number of Western scholars have already discussed and 
analyzed the factors that contributed to the emergence of these Islamist groups in the 
region.7 The ‘old’ IRPT, the IMU, and Hizb ut-Tahrir represent the first generation of 
post-Soviet Central Asian Islamists who have aimed at a radical change by utilizing 
either political violence or grassroots propaganda. It is the early political Islam that 
has rebelled unsuccessfully against the state and now sees its influence diminishing. 
 
The emergence of the Islamo-democrats 
Since the mid 2000s, political Islam in Central Asia has been evolved into a 
more diverse movement. New actors have emerged who seek to promote the 
Islamization of societies by compromise rather than conflict. The second generation 
of Islamists has attempted to dissociate itself from those who use violence or 
propaganda as a means to political change. The article will now turn to three 
prominent representatives of the new political Islam in Central Asia. 
 
Tursunbai Bakir Uulu 
                                                 
7 See Mehrdad Haghayeghi. 1995. Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press; Martha Brill Olcott. 1995. “Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent 
Central Asia”. In Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: 
Frank Cass; Ahmed Rashid. 2000. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. 
London: Penguin; Olivier Roy. 2000. The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian Islamic 
Renaissance Party. New York: Council on Foreign Relations; Yaacov Ro’I. 2001. 
Islam in the CIS: A Threat to Stability? London: The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs; Richard Weitz. 2004. “Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan?”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27: 6 
(November-December): 505-530; Vitaly V. Naumkin. 2005. Radical Islam in Central 
Asia: Between Pen and Rifle. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 
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Tursunbai Bakir Uulu is a Kyrgyz politician known for his Islamist tendencies. 
He was born in March 1958 in the southern Kyrgyz town of Kara-Suu which is one of 
the most religious places in the country. He is a historian who graduated from the 
Kyrgyz National University in 1984. He received a postgraduate degree from the Kiev 
State University in 1990 and he taught for several years at the Osh Pedagogical 
Institute in southern Kyrgyzstan.  
He first entered the Kyrgyz parliament in February 1995 as member of the 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan Progressive and Democratic Party, a small nationalist party of 
intellectuals. In the summer of 1999, he negotiated the release of Japanese hostages 
held by members of the IMU.8 In February 2000, he was re-elected MP but two years 
later became the country’s first ombudsman. Bakir Uulu held the post of ombudsman 
until 2008. He then served as Kyrgyz ambassador to Malaysia from April 2009 to 
September 2010. He ran unsuccessfully as a presidential candidate in 2000, 2005, and 
2011. In the October 2011 presidential elections, Bakir Uulu received 15,000 votes, 
which represented only 0.84 percent of the vote.9 He is a frequent user of Twitter and 
his videos have been posted on YouTube. 
As ombudsman, Bakir Uulu paid attention to the protection of Kyrgyz living 
abroad, called for the improvement of conditions in the country’s prisons, advocated 
minority rights, and fought government corruption.10 According to WikiLeaks, US 
diplomats viewed Bakir Uulu as a “serious, publicly devout former Ombudsman…in 
                                                 
8 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: Outspoken Ombudsman Possesses Unique Regional 
Voice”, RFE/RL, July 22, 2004, At http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1053984.html, 
accessed October 3, 2015. 
9Centralnaja izbiratelnaja komissija, Predvaritelnye rezultaty, At 
http://www.shailoo.gov.kg/Itogi/, accessed August 4, 2015. 
10 Personal communication with Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, August 
2011. 
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which capacity he worked constructively with the Embassy on human rights issues”.11 
Yet, Bakir Uulu has been an outspoken critic of the US government. For instance, he 
has opposed the establishment of US airbase in Manas and has criticized Washington 
for its conduct in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Bakir Uulu has been active in defending Muslim rights and pride in 
Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. In August 2006, the Kyrgyz politician cancelled his visit 
to the United States as a protest to President Bush’s use of the term “Islamic 
fascists”.12 While he was ombudsman, Bakir Uulu openly questioned the Kyrgyz 
government’s decision to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir as an extremist group. In his view, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir has not actually broken the law, since other parties (e.g. the Party of 
Communists of Kyrgyzstan) would like to change fundamentally the society as well.13 
As a result, Bakir Uulu has called for the legalization of the group. In return, Hizb ut-
Tahrir supported him during the July 2005 presidential elections since he promised to 
rule by the Quran and sharia. Nonetheless, he received only 3.9 percent of the votes.14  
In November 2008, Bakir Uulu together with businessman Nurlan Motuev 
established the Union of Kyrgyz Muslims (Sojuz Musulman Kyrgyzstana – hereafter 
UKM) in order to provide “constructive opposition to the government”.15 The UKM 
was established to function as a de facto party because the Kyrgyz constitution forbids 
religious parties. In the words of Bakir Uulu, the UKM “represented a moderate Islam 
                                                 
11 “Union of Kyrgyz Muslims –Islamic Awakening or Stalking Horse?”, February 26, 
2009, At http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09BISHKEK169.html#, accessed August 
6, 2015. 
12 “Kyrgyz Official Spurns U.S. over ‘Islamic Fascists’ Remark”, August 16, 2006, At 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070615.html, accessed August 13, 2015. 
13 “Kyrgyzstan’s Ombudsman Rejects Persecution of Hizb ut-Tahrir”, RFE/RL 
Newsline, March 3, 2003, At http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142866.html, 
accessed August 16, 2015. 
14 Elmurad Zhusupaliyev, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan: We Are Being Harassed for 
Active Participation in the Presidential Election”, Ferghana.ru News Agency, August 
10, 2005. 
15 “Union of Kyrgyz Muslims –Islamic Awakening or Stalking Horse?”, op.cit.  
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and is opposed to radicals”.16 The UKM called for “economic development consistent 
with the canons of Islam, for strengthening the fight against corruption, and for 
making public life more moral”.17 In 2009, Motuev had a row with Bakir Uulu and 
created his own group, the Union of True Muslims of Kyrgyzstan. 
Moreover, Bakir Uulu has frequently questioned the pro-Western orientation 
of the Kyrgyz foreign policy. During his 2005 presidential campaign, Bakir Uulu 
expressed his intention to  
 
Apologize to Arab countries for Askar Akayev’s [ Kyrgyzstan’s first 
president] mistakes. In 1993, during his visit to Israel, when [the Israelis] 
wanted to make Jerusalem capital, the Kyrgyz president offended the whole 
world by saying: We would then open embassy [in Jerusalem]. None of the 
Arab countries have embassies in Kyrgyzstan. If we apologize and bring 
investment from there, they will give interest-free loans.18  
 
Bakir Uulu has often criticized Israel for the use of violence against Palestinian 
civilians. In January 2009, for example, when the UKM protested against the Israeli 
invasion of Gaza, Bakir Uulu was arrested for burning an Israeli flag.19  
                                                 
16  Arslan Mamatov, “Kyrgyzstan: National Protests to Bear an Islamic Stamp”, 
Eurasianet, December 3, 2008, At 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav120408a.shtml, accessed 
September 3, 2015. 
17 Sebastien Peyrouse and Sadykzhan Ibraimov, “Iran’s Central Asia Temptations”, 
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 10, August 17, 2010, At  
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/irans-central-asia-temptations, accessed 
September 13, 2015. 
18 “Kyrgyzstan Should be Neutral State, Presidential Runner Says”, BBC Monitoring 
Central Asia quoting Kyrgyz Television First Channel, Bishkek, June 28, 2005,  
19 “Kyrgyzstan: Ex-Ombudsman Bakir Uulu Detained during pro-Palestinian 
Protests”, January 14, 2009, At 
http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=937&print=1, accessed October 1, 2015. 
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In recent years, the Kyrgyz MP has focused more on social and cultural issues. 
In October 2011, the Kyrgyz parliament’s cafeteria stopped selling alcohol after Bakir 
Uulu complained to the parliament speaker because some MPs were smelling 
alcohol.20 In December 2012, during a meeting with Bishkek students, he put forward 
a list of “un-Islamic” festivities (e.g. the Women’s Day on March 8, the International 
Workers’ Day on May 1) that should be abolished in a predominantly Muslim country 
like Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, he asked for the cancellation of New Year’s celebrations 
because “this is not an Islamic celebration…perhaps some Muslims mark this event 
without understanding the meaning of it, [but] New Year’s is not our holiday and it is 
wrong for us to celebrate it”.21  
In March 2013, Bakir Uulu stirred controversy when he suggested changing 
the day of rest from Sunday to Friday claiming that “85 percent of population of the 
Kyrgyz Republic profess Islam and implement their Islamic duties in the everyday 
life”.22 In addition, pointing to the shortage of men as a consequence of emigration, 
Bakir Uulu has advocated the legalization of polygamy, which remains a controversial 
issue in Kyrgyzstan.23 He has claimed that the Western values of “sexual 
                                                 
20 “Alcohol Sales in Kyrgyz Parliament Banned”, CentralAsiaOnline, October 21, 
2011, At 
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2011/10/21/newsbrief-03, 
accessed October 1, 2015. 
21 Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asians Stand By ‘Un-Islamic’ New Year’s 
Traditions”, RFE/RL, December 27, 2012, At http://www.rferl.org/content/central-
asians-stand-by-unislamic-new-years-traditions/24810103.html, accessed October 3, 
2015. Also, see “Tursunbai Bakir Uulu:  musulmane prazdnujusie novyj god - eto 
nepolnocennye verujusie”, December 14, 2012, At http://islam-today.ru/article/6129/, 
accessed October 3, 2015. 
22 “Kyrgyz MPs Offer to Change Day Off from Sunday to Friday”, Trend News 
Agency, March 12, 2013 available at 
http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kyrgyzstan/2128473.html, accessed October 1, 2015. 
23 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: Debate on Legalized Polygamy Continues”, RFE/RL, 
March 8, 2007 available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075173.html, 
accessed October 3, 2015. 
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emancipation and lechery” threaten the Kyrgyz culture.24 More importantly, he has 
called Kyrgyz women to wear hijab and not the traditional white turban known as 
elecheck which is “less convenient for prayers”.25 
Bakir Uulu has claimed to be the first Kyrgyz MP that visited Mecca to 
perform hajj, although now there are at least 15 MPs who have performed this 
religious duty.26 Therefore, he has attempted to capitalize on his Islamic credentials, 
portraying himself as a pioneer and defender of the Muslim faith in Kyrgyzstan. In 
this way, he can differentiate himself from the old Soviet generation of Kyrgyz 
politicians who still treat Islam as an “enemy of the state” and can maintain an 
electoral base consisting of devout Muslims. 
 
Bekbolat Tleukhan 
Bekbolat Tleukhan is a prominent representative of the new political Islam in 
neighbouring Kazakhstan. He was born in 1966 in the city of Atasu in central 
Kazakhstan. He allegedly participated in the December 1986 events in Almaty as a 
young university student.27 He graduated from the Kazakh National Technical 
                                                 
24 Asel Kalybekova, “Kyrgyzstan Q & A: Author of ‘Foreign Agents’ Bill Seeks to 
Thwart ‘Sabotage”, Eurasianet.Org, October 3, 2013, At  
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67580, accessed September 23, 2015. 
25 “Tursunbai Bakir uulu: Islam smotrit na ljubov po-drugomu”, Newspaper Jany 
Agim, February 22, 2013, p. 13 
26 Aigul Tokoeva, “Tursunbai Bakir Uulu: Slava Allahu, kollegi stanoviatsia 
blagovernymi musulmanami”, Vecherniy Bishkek, February 26, 2013, At 
http://www.vb.kg/doc/218066_tyrsynbay_bakir_yyly:_slava_allahy_kollegi_stanoviat
sia_blagovernymi_mysylmanami.html, accessed August 23, 2015. 
27 In December 1986, riots broke out in Almaty and other Kazakh cities after Mikhail 
Gorbachev replaced First Secretary of Kazakhstan’s Communist Party 
Dinmukhammed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh, by Gennady Kolbin - an ethnic Russian  
from Russia. This decision went against what had previously been the norm in the 
Soviet Union, namely a native to take the post of the First Secretary and a Slav the 
post of the Deputy First Secretary. The riots were dispersed by the police and army 
units as well as groups of Russian workers armed with sticks. For Tleukhan’s alleged 
participation in the events see “Deputat Bekbolat Tleuhan prosel proverku na 
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University as metallurgical engineer. Nevertheless, Tleukhan worked as an academic 
at Kurmangazy Almaty State Conservatory’s Department of Folk Singing and became 
a well-known folk musician in Kazakhstan. In October 2002, Tleukhan was appointed 
deputy minister of Culture, Information and Social Concord and two years later he 
joined Majilis, namely Kazakhstan’s Lower House of Parliament, as an MP.  
In the first years of his political career, Tleukhan kept a low profile. As 
member of the ruling party Nur Otan, he supported wholeheartedly the Nazarbayev 
regime. Following the ousting of Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev by protestors in 
2005, which came to be known as the Tulip revolution, Tleukhan called for a state 
strategy to present a similar uprising in Kazakhstan organized by “young traitors”.28  
In recent years, he has become increasingly vocal about the role of religion in 
Kazakhstan. In September 2011, during a parliament debate for a draft law on 
Religious Activities and Religious Institutions, Theukhan criticized the decision to 
ban the wearing of hijab in state institutions by asking “why are we setting such strict 
constraints for our women, why are we forbidding them to wear hijab? This is their 
right. Let them wear it for Allah’s sake!”.29 The Kazakh MP, who is a practicing 
Muslim, warned against the approval of the aforementioned law by the parliament 
because there is a provision banning prayer at workplace; he asked, “will I be 
                                                                                                                                            
detektore lzi”, TengriNews, October 16, 2011, At 
http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/deputat-bekbolat-tleuhan-proshel-proverku-na-
detektore-lji-199283/, accessed August 12, 2015. 
28 Antoine Blua, “Kazakhstan/Azerbaijan: Governments Try to Keep Young on their 
Side”, Eurasianet, April 10, 2005, At 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp041105a.shtml, 
accessed September 3, 2015. 
29 “Kazakh MP Asked to Ban Kazakh Women From Showing Belly-Buttons”, Tengri 
News, September 9, 2011, At http://en.tengrinews.kz/people/4335/, accessed 
September 1, 2015. 
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violating the law and effectively become a criminal if I pray in my office?”.30 
Theukhan argued, with some justification, that the law violated Kazakhstan’s 
constitution which protects freedom of religion. The law was probably Nazarbayev 
regime’s response to increased Islamic militancy. In the fall of 2011, Kazakhstan was 
rocked by a series of attacks against government buildings and security forces in the 
cities of Atyrau and Taraz respectively. A previously unknown group calling itself 
Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) claimed responsibility and threatened 
further attacks if the Kazakh government did not repeal a restrictive law on religion.31 
As a result of his outspoken views on Islam, Tleukhan has received increased 
media attention. During an interview, he argued that “Islam is the religion of 
forefathers. The religion of Islam is needed to fill the spiritual vacuum for the young 
people. Only in that case young people won’t follow other sects”.32 In addition, 
Tleukhan has espoused social conservatism. He once criticized an opposition 
newspaper for publishing a semi-naked picture of Nazarbayev by stating that 
 
Think of the times of Ablai Khan [Kazakh monarch of the 18th century], when 
a person was buried alive for letting the khan's hat fall on the ground. Now we 
have the publication of a picture of a naked president. The president is a 
                                                 
30 Farangis Najibullah, “Following Terrorist Attacks, Kazakhstan Hurriedly Tightens 
Religious Law”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 29, 2011, At 
http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan_new_religious_law_islam_extremism/24341
450.html, accessed September 3, 2015. 
31 Bill Roggio, “Jund al-khilafah Claims Attack in Kazakhstan”, The Long War 
Journal, November 16, 2011, At 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/jund_al_khilafah_cla.php, accessed 
September 3, 2015. 
32  “Bekbolat Tleukhan: Mina zamannin qarqini qatti”, Neweurasianet.org, February 
16, 2008, At http://neweurasia.net/kazakhstan/ kazakhstan/саясат/бекболат-
тілеухан-мына-заманның-қарқ/, accessed September 13, 2015. 
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symbol. The symbol should not be scorned… And you must not show the 
Kazakh president naked.33 
Moreover, he has called for the ban of films with erotic scenes and the removal of 
advertisements for them from the streets.34 Tleukhan has criticized certain Kazakh-
produced soup operas as being “immoral” because they make a mockery of the 
society.35 
In spite of his pro-Islamist rhetoric, Theukhan has been eager to show his 
loyalty to President Nazarbayev by making extraordinary statements; once, for 
example, he stated that “for me, he (i.e. Nazarbayev) is a God-appointed person”.36 
He has also compared Nazarbayev to Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founding father.37 Yet, 
Tleukhan was not included in the Nur Otan’s list of candidates for the January 2012 
parliamentary elections because during a conversation with Kazakh intellectuals he 
talked about the prominence of Wahhabism.38 Yet, he has denounced the ISIS as “the 
enemy no. 1 in Kazakhstan” since the jihadi group has recruited Kazakh children.39 
Since 2013, he has been President of the Association of National Sports. 
 
                                                 
33 “Kazakhstan: Thin-Skinned Deputy Keeps Railing at Borat”, Eurasianet.org, 
December 8, 2010, At http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62526, accessed September 12, 
2015. 
34 Murat Laumulin. 2012. “Religious Situation in Central Asia and Threat of 
Religious Extremism”, Central Asia’s Affairs, 2 (47): 12.  
35 Zhasulan  Kuzhekov, “Deputat Tleuhan iskljucaet incest i drugie poroki iz imidza 
nasego obsestva”, Informacionno-analiticeskii Centr , September 26, 2010, At 
http://www.ia-centr.ru/expert/9015/, accessed September 12, 2015. 
36 “Outrage as Kazakh Leader Snapped in Swimming Trunks”, Reuters, September 
26, 2007, At http://www.newswatch.in/archives/newsblog/outrage-as-kazakh-leader-
snapped-in-swimming-trunks.html, accessed September 23, 2015. 
37 See “Sirokii rezonans”, Izvestia Kazakhstan, December 16, 2009, At 
http://www.izvestia.kz/node/2033, accessed September 8, 2015. 
38 See “Deputat Majilis RK. Bekbolat Tyleukhanov podderzivaet wahhabism”, At 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7SWO_xGEBOQ, accessed September 8, 2015.  
39Bekbolat Tleukhan, “Kazakka karsy shabuyl”, November 23, 2014, At 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWwVty2Xxcw, accessed September 8, 2015. 
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Muhiddin Kabiri 
Muhiddin Kabiri was born in Faizabad, a small town in central Tajikistan, in 
1966. He graduated from the Faculty of Oriental Languages (Arabic Department) at 
the Tajik National University. In addition, he studied in Yemen’s Sana University and 
Russia’s Diplomatic Academy. During 1997-2000, he acted as an advisor to the IRPT 
chairman Said Abdullo Nuri; in this capacity, he served as an international law expert 
in the Inter-Tajik Peace Talks. Kabiri became the deputy chairman of the IRPT in 
2000 and was elected member of the Tajik parliament in 2005.  
During the mid-2000s, the IRPT was divided between young reformists and 
the old generation of Islamist leaders who fought during the civil war. Despite being a 
veteran Islamist and member of the old guard, Said Abdullo Nuri surprised everyone 
and selected Muhiddin Kabiri as the next leader of the IRPT in the summer of 2006.  
Although the ideological transformation of the IRPT started after the end of 
the Tajik civil war, Kabiri has taken credit for moving the party to the centre. His 
predecessor had built a party that was supported largely by mullahs, peasants, and 
Gharmi Tajiks. In contrast, Kabiri has expanded the electoral base of the ‘new IRPT’ 
to include students, women, urban dwellers, and even non-Muslims. The US 
ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, described him as a politician who 
“appears genuinely to be moderate and to understand Western-style democratic 
politics…. [T]he West should carefully find ways to support Kabiri as a new-
generation, moderate Islamic leader”.40 It should be noted that Kabiri has no religious 
                                                 
40 Richard Hoagland, “Moderate Tajik Islamic Leader Walks a Tightrope – 
Rahmonov Wants to Marginalize him; His Party’s Islamist’s Wing Distrusts Him”, 
November 28, 2005, At 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/11/05DUSHANBE1870.html#, accessed 
September 10, 2015. 
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education and has deemphasized the IRPT’s Islamic origins. After his re-election as 
party chairman in 2011, Kabiri stated that  
 
The motto of our party reads Trust in Allah, loyalty to the Motherland, service 
to the people. The emphasis will change now. Our relationship with Allah is 
our personal matter. There is no need to continue announcing [its Islamic 
principles], that is, emphasizing the first part of our motto. We now need to 
focus our efforts on the second and third parts of the motto.41  
 
Kabiri’s ambitious effort to make the IRPT a more moderate and less Islamic-
oriented party has not gone unchallenged. It appears that conservative veteran 
members explored the possibility of nominating Nuri’s elder son, Muhammadjon 
Nuri, who is an Iranian-trained alim [Islamic scholar], as a candidate for party 
chairman in 2011.42 Moreover, prominent members of the party such as Hoji Akbar 
Turajonzoda and his brother Eshon Nouriddinjon have been known for their pro-
Iranian inclinations.43 
Although the IRPT received Iranian support during the Tajik civil war and 
there is still a strong pro-Iranian wing within the party, Kabiri seems to have little 
interest to develop links further with Shia-majority Iran. Instead, he has increased his 
                                                 
41Alexander Sodiqov, “Kabiri Reelected as Islamic Revival Party Leader in 
Tajikistan”, Central Asian-Caucasus Institute Analyst, October 19, 2011, At 
http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5646/print, accessed September 10, 2015.   
42 Ibid. 
43 In December 2011, for example, both brothers were accused of creating sectarian 
strife by commemorating the Shia festival of Ashura. See Mark Vinson, “Iranian Soft 
Power in Tajikistan: Beyond Cultural and Economic Ties”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 
(52), March 14, 2012, At 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39133
&cHash=700f316f09ba2981e2aaec4871a8aef4#.Vlv7KnYrLIU, accessed August 3, 
2015. 
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international contacts by travelling frequently to Western and Sunni-majority 
countries to make presentations and hold meetings. In April 2012, Kabiri met the 
Russian ambassador to Tajikistan to discuss about opportunities to expand cultural 
and spiritual ties between the IRPT and Russian Muslims.44  
In his speeches, Kabiri has been keen to emphasize the “Tajikness” of the 
IRPT because the party is still suspected of having a hidden agenda to turn the 
country into an Iranian-type Islamic republic. Kabiri has not fully endorsed Tajik 
nationalism; for example, he has not supported the idea of a Greater Tajikistan which 
would include the Uzbek cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, and the northern parts of 
Afghanistan.45 Instead, he has advocated regional integration by establishing a 
European Union-like confederation of Central Asian states since they share the 
Islamic culture.46 
Kabiri has advocated Muslim rights in Tajikistan since the Rahmonov regime 
has adopted a coercive policy to stop the growing religiosity of the population. In 
response to the rising number of Tajik women wearing the hijab, in October 2005, 
Tajik authorities decided to ban the headscarf in schools and universities. Kabiri and 
the IRPT have defended women’s right to wear the Islamic veil, claiming that it is a 
question of human rights.47 But the chairman of the IRPT has avoided an open 
                                                 
44 Payrav Chorshanbiyev, “Muhiddin Kabiri Meets with US, Russian Ambassadors”, 
Asia-Plus, April 19, 2012, At http://news.tj/en/news/muhiddin-kabiri-meets-us-
russian-ambassadors, accessed August3, 2015. 
45 Personal communication with Muhiddin Kabiri, Exeter, Great Britain, 24 
November, 2012 
46 Personal communication with Muhiddin Kabiri, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, January 31, 
2005 
47 Farangis Najibullah, “Islamic Party Leader in Tajikistan Says He Supports Secular 
System”, RFE/RL Features, September 15, 2009, At 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Islamic_Party_Leader_In_Tajikistan_Says_He_Supports
_Secular_System_/1823086.html, accessed September 5, 2015. 
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discussion about the controversial issue of polygamy in Tajikistan possibly in order 
not to antagonize female members and voters. 
Kabiri has increasingly presented himself as a modern politician who favours 
consensual rather than adversarial politics. Indeed, Kabiri has argued that the IRPT 
does not want “to create an Islamic state or an Islamic republic in Tajikistan. But we 
want to create an Islamic society. Governments can include technocrats or non-
practicing Muslims or others, but our most important goal is the creation of a society 
that lives with Islamic values”.48 In other words, Kabiri has favored a cultural and 
social Islamization of Tajikistan. 
Nevertheless, the IRPT has been the target of a government crackdown since 
the summer of 2015. On September 30, 2015, Tajikistan’s Supreme Court banned the 
IRPT as a terrorist group.49 Three month earlier Kabiri had been forced into self-exile 
to avoid prosecution for allegedly breaking the law during a property transaction 16 
years ago.50 As of this writing, it is not clear what his future of Kabiri holds. Most 
recently, members of the IRPT have been accused of supporting the mutiny of former 
Deputy Defense Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda in September 2015.51  
 
Comparing the three politicians 
In spite of their countries’ secular constitutions, Central Asian leaders have 
utilized the Muslim faith to gain legitimacy. Following the breakup of the Soviet 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 “Tajikistan Bans the Islamic Revival Party as Terrorist Group”, ASIA-Plus, 
September 30, 2015, At http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/tajikistan-bans-islamic-
revival-party-terrorist-group, accessed October 3, 2015. 
50 David Trilling, “Tajikistan Drives Top Opposition Leader Into Exile”, Eurasianet, 
June 18, 2015, At http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73931, accessed August 4, 2015. 
51 Farangis Najibullah, “Death Of A Fugitive: Abduhalim Nazarzoda, Tajik General 
Blamed For Recent Violence”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, September 16, 
2015, At http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-general-nazarzoda-deadly-
attacks/27233955.html,  accessed November 3, 2015. 
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Union, the Central Asian republics established separate Muslim boards to manage 
religious affairs. Thus, Islam has been acknowledged as the majority faith. 
Simultaneously, Central Asian regimes have infused ethnic or indigenous elements 
into their state-approved versions of acceptable Islam.52 In this context, authorities 
have aimed at regulating religious activities and restrict the visibility of the Muslim 
faith. Any public manifestation of Islam that is not sanctioned by the regime, it is 
often considered a security threat.  
At first sight, Bakir Uulu, Tleukhan and Kabiri only defend religious freedoms 
and values. This stance alone would not have been enough to classify a politician in 
the West as “Islamist”. Yet in the context of Central Asia, any deviation from the 
official policy could carry consequences; thus, their preoccupation with Islamic issues 
can be interpreted as a conscious political decision.  
The three politicians have adopted a hybrid Islamism which includes advocacy 
for a greater public role of Islam. Their vision of Islamic society conflicts with the 
official doctrine of quasi-separation between state and religion. Indeed, Bakir Uulu, 
Tleukhan, and Kabiri have favored a “soft Islamization” of the society. Yet, they have 
avoided a direct confrontation with the ruling elites. Therefore, the three leaders have 
choose to campaign through the political process and within the constitution.  
Their electoral base is mainly devout Muslims who want to support candidates 
more willing to acknowledge Muslim values such as female modesty. Having said 
that, these Islamist leaders do not have a religious education and they do not offer any 
                                                 
52 In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the authorities have sponsored an indigenous and 
traditionalist Islam, which includes certain local peculiarities—such as worship of 
saints and ancestors—as opposed to the universalist Islam which adheres to a 
standardized code of rituals and practices. See Aurelie Biard, “The Religious Factor in 
the Reification of ‘Neo-Ethnic’ Identities in Kyrgyzstan,” Nationalities Papers 38, no. 
3 (2010): 323-335. 
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novel interpretations of the Muslim scripts. Like many modern politicians, they have 
used both the old and the new media to communicate their messages. 
In spite of many similarities, the three representatives of the new political 
Islam have different orientations and priorities. Bakir Uulu has used anti-American 
and anti-Israeli rhetoric, and has advocated closer relations with Muslim countries. He 
is a populist politician who best plays the role of an activist in raising awareness about 
Islamic issues. Tleukhan has avoided criticizing the West, but he has apparently 
supported the Salafi branch of Islam which has been viewed by many in Kazakhstan 
as “Arabic” and “extreme”. He is an artist turned into an advocate of Islam in public 
life without developing a concrete political agenda. Kabiri has cultivated relations 
with Muslim-majority countries, but he has also been eager to maintain close contacts 
with Western governments and institutions. He is more a leader than a thinker and he 
is building a reputation of being pragmatic rather than a rigid ideologue. Their views 
are summarized in Table 1. 
 Public 
wearing of 
Hijab 
Polygamy Relations 
with the 
West 
Relations 
with Muslim 
Countries 
Bakir Uulu Positive Positive Negative Positive 
Tleukhan Positive Unknown Unknown Positive 
Kabiri Positive Unknown Positive Positive 
Table 1 
Their different political behavior stems from their professional background: 
Bakir Uulu is a political loner who could afford to act independently by establishing 
ad hoc alliances; Tleukhan is a political child of the Nazarbayev regime but he 
attempted to become a semi-independent actor; Kabiri comes from the post-civil war 
generation of Islamist leaders and his political survival depends on the support of the 
party machinery. 
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 It is difficult to measure the political influence of Islamo-democrats in the 
three countries under study. To begin with, Bakir Uulu has had a robust career as 
member of the Kyrgyz parliament, presidential candidate, ombudsman, and 
ambassador. Despite his pro-Islamist and controversial views, Bakir Uulu has 
obviously been able to survive politically. It is clear that he has some following 
among the Kyrgyz electorate, particularly in the southern part of the country.  
Before getting expelled from the Nur-Otan’s party election list for his views 
on Islam, Tleukhan served as member of the Kazakh parliament and deputy minister 
of the government. Besides, he has gained the status of a political celebrity who is 
reported on and sought after by Kazakhstan’s media. His Twitter account has 115,000 
followers, which means that he is one of the most followed persons in the Kazakhstan.  
Before the government crackdown of 2015, the IRPT was gaining popularity 
in Tajik society evidenced by the growing number of members; there were 42,000 
registered members (including many women) in 2012 and the party had reached out to 
Tajik migrants working in Russia.53 In the post–civil war period, the IRPT has taken 
part in every parliamentary election (2000, 2005, 2010), drawing seven to eight 
percent of votes and gaining two seats in the Lower House of the national parliament 
(Majlisi namoyandagon). Kabiri was an MP for ten years until the March 2015 
parliamentary elections when his party failed to pass the 5-percent threshold required 
to enter the parliament. 
 
                                                 
53 See “Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan Declares Growing Popularity in spite of 
Government Pressure”, Interfax, April 12, 2012, At http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=news&div=9255, accessed September 11, 2015; “Muhiddin Kabiri: 
Politics and Stability in Tajikistan”, Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme 
Meeting Summary, November 26, 2012, At   
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20E
urasia/261112summary.pdf, accessed September 9, 2015. 
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Explaining the emergence of the Islamo-democrats 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of 
communism, many Central Asians Muslims have sought to rediscover their religious 
roots and live a more Islamic life; as a result, some of them have developed an interest 
in Islamism as an alternative viewpoint. Despite their efforts, the IMU and Hizb ut-
Tahrir have gained limited popularity among Central Asian Muslims who tend to 
view them as out of touch with post-Soviet realities.  
The failure of radical Islamists has contributed to the emergence of 
independent actors with an Islam-based political agenda.  The representatives of the 
new political Islam have attempted to fill the political and ideological vacuum by 
promoting a hybrid Islamism. They have focused largely on symbolic and normative 
issues (e.g. wearing of hijab). Simultaneously, they have collaborated with the state 
authorities by publicly condemning radical Islamists.54 Therefore, they are not 
considered to be an “existential threat” against the post-communist ruling elites. 
But the emergence of Islamo-democrats is not a purely local phenomenon. 
Although politically fragmented, the Muslim world still forms a large religious–
cultural system that is interconnected and interrelated. Members of the ummah 
constantly borrow and lend ideas, norms, and strategies. Naturally, any major political 
change in one part of this system would somehow affect the other parts. It will be 
claimed that the emergence of Islamo-democrats in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Tajikistan is partly the result of important political developments taking place outside 
                                                 
54 Bakir Uulu has frequently condemned Islamic militants (See “Kyrgyzstan: National 
Protests to Bear an Islamic Stamp”); Tleukhan has publicly denied any sympathy to 
radical Islam (See “Deputat Bekbolat Tleuhan prosel proverku na detektore lzi”), and 
Kabiri has criticized both “extremist” groups such as the IMU which use violence and 
“radical” groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir which work against an independent and 
sovereign Tajikistan (See “Tajikistan: Kabiri’s IRPT Takes a Time Out”, Embassy 
Dushanbe, September 26, 2006, At 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06DUSHANBE1766). 
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Central Asia. The new political Islam of Central Asia is largely modeled after 
Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – hereafter 
AKP).  
The rise of AKP in Turkey has served as an example of convergence between 
Islam and parliamentary democracy. The party was established in August 2001 by 
former members of the Islamist Virtue Party, which was banned a month earlier, and 
other conservative political figures. The AKP won the parliamentary elections of 
2002, 2007, 2011 and 2015; as a result, the party has had a large majority of seats in 
the parliament and the country’s top political positions - the presidency, the 
premiership, and the speakership of the parliament - are held by AKP leaders. It has 
adhered to an ideology that combines social conservatism with a pro-business 
agenda.55 The AKP government has taken credit for Turkey’s booming economy 
while engaging in culture wars over largely symbolic issues – such as the wearing of 
veil in universities and the banning of alcohol during the Ramadan.56 
Besides, the AKP government has sought EU membership and has maintained 
close ties with the United States. According to Ahmet Kuru, the AKP model could 
pursue Muslim politics without establishing an Islamic state.57 Therefore, the AKP 
can hardly be classified as a typical Islamist party; it may be more accurate to 
                                                 
55 On the AKP see Gamze Avci. 2011. “The Justice and Development Party and the 
EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment”, South European Society and 
Politics 16: 3: 409-421; William Hale. 2005. “Christian Democracy and the AKP: 
Parallels and Contrasts”, Turkish Studies 6:2: 293-310; Hasan Turunc. 2007. “Islamist 
or Democratic? The AKP’s Search for Identity in Turkish Politics”, Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies 15: 1: 79-91. 
56 Interview with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan: Leader Says Headscarf Ban at 
Universities ‘Unfortunate’, Spiegel Online, September 20, 2007, At 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkish-prime-minister-erdogan-leader-
says-headscarf-ban-at-universities-unfortunate-a-506896.html, accessed September 
12, 2015. 
57 Ahmet Kuru, “Muslim Politics Without an Islamic State: Can Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party be a Model for Arab Islamists?”, Brookings Doha Centre, Policy 
Briefing, February 2013, p. 3. 
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describe it as “Islamist-leaning”. In any case, the AKP has attempted to export its own 
model for governance to other Muslim-majority countries.58  
The rise of AKP in Turkey has given birth to a sui generis political system, the 
Islamo-democracy, where political pluralism coexists with Islamic values. The 
Islamo-democracy is closely identified with the existing state and does not support the 
abolition of borders. As opposed to neo-Caliphatist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir that 
have envisioned the establishment of a universal Islamic state that is not embedded in 
any particular territory, the Islamo-democrats tend to emphasize the notion of 
homeland.   
Since it is located on the periphery of the Muslim world, Central Asia is 
influenced by new political trends perhaps with some delay. Owing to the 
globalization of information, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Tajiks have become increasingly 
more aware of political developments in the greater Middle East. Indeed, the Islamo-
democrats of Central Asia stand ready to learn valuable lessons from Turkey. During 
a speech at the George Washington University in October 2012, Kabiri admitted that  
 
Our party considers all models, the Turkish and Malaysian included. I visited 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia…to study the experience of the new 
governments and by applying this experience to our national values and those 
realities that exist in Central Asia and Tajikistan…but closer to us today is the 
Turkish experience, though, I must confess, I am talking about it very little 
                                                 
58 Ӧmer Taşpinar 2011. “Turkey: An Interested Party.” In Kenneth Pollack (et al), The 
Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute, pp. 270-272.   
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[because] many people in Tajikistan, especially our intellectuals, are very 
sensitive to ideas of pan-Turkism.59  
 
Bakir Uulu has also looked at Turkey as a role model of a country that 
combines democracy with a larger public role of Islam. During an interview with the 
author in August 2011, Bakir Uulu argued that Turkish model could serve as a source 
of inspiration for the development of Kyrgyzstan.60 From his point of view, “the 
Kyrgyz people need to adopt an ideology which is rooted in the Muslim faith because 
after the fall of communism there is an ideological vacuum”. In his opinion, the rise to 
power of the AKP in Turkey has demonstrated that it is possible to utilize the 
“Muslim faith as mobilizing force for the promotion of democratization in 
authoritarian countries”.61 
Tleukhan has visited Turkey several times as deputy minister and member of 
the parliament. Yet, it is not known whether he ever had any contacts with AKP and 
Turkish Islamists. At the minimum, he has supported the idea of pan-Turkic 
cooperation in the fields of culture and sports.62 He is the least open about his political 
vision for the future of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.  
The causality between developments in Turkey and the emergence of Islamo-
democrats in Central Asia can be explained by two factors: the successful diffusion of 
                                                 
59 Transcript of Mr. Kabiri’s speech and discussion at the Central Asian Program, 
George Washington University, October 16, 2012, At 
http://www.centralasiaprogram.org/images/Voices_from_CA_8,_October_2012.pdf, 
accessed September 4, 2015. 
60 Personal communication with Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, August 
2011. 
61 Ibid. 
62 “The First Open Kokpar Championship of Asia Starts in Astana”, Official Site of 
Akimat of Astana, September 9, 2013, At 
http://astana.gov.kz/en/modules/material/2396, accessed October3, 2015. 
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ideological norms and the importance that governments attach to maintaining a good 
relationship with Turkey.  
First, the transmission of ideas and norms is a constant feature of international 
politics.63 Due to their religious and ethnic links, Central Asian countries are closer to 
Turkey than other Muslim countries. This is true even in the case of Tajikistan which 
is the only Farsi-speaking country in the region. From the pan-Turkism of the 
Basmachi movement to the secularism of the kemalist regime, Central Asian societies 
have been exposed for decades to ideas and norms originating from Turkey. 
Currently, the most important ideological norm diffused from Turkey to 
Central Asia is that of Islamic difference. It is defined as public manifestation of the 
Muslim faith such as wearing of hijab, restrictions on the consumption of alcohol, 
banning of nudity etc. The diffusion of ideological norms from Turkey to Central Asia 
has been mostly achieved through the mechanisms of persuasion and influence, which 
are facilitated by a variety of channels, such as media, the Internet, tourism, education 
and religious organizations, and the business community.  
To begin with, Turkish satellite channels like Avaz have broadcasted in 
regional languages such as Kazakh and Kyrgyz.64 Thus, local viewers are familiar 
with the religiosity of the Turkish society. Besides, thousands of students from 
Central Asia have studied at Turkish universities, and citizens of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan do not need a visa to enter Turkey.65 Also, the norm of Islamic difference 
                                                 
63 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: 
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
64 “New Turkish TV Channel Broadcasts To Balkans, Central Asia, Caucasus”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 23, 2009, At 
http://www.rferl.org/content/New_Turkish_TV_Channel_Broadcasts_To_Balkans_Ce
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65 Bruce Pannier, “Turkish-Russian Tensions Put Central Asia In A Tough Spot”, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 25, 2015, At 
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has been diffused through Turkish education, including schools linked to the Gülen 
movement.66 Finally, members of the Turkish business community have contributed 
to the transmission of the norm through interactions with locals. 
While the AKP plays the role of ideological norm promoter, the Islamo-
democrats of Central Asia are not passive receivers. There is a process of localization 
that entails the reinterpretation of the norm and its adjustment to national conditions.67 
For example, the Islamo-democrats have portrayed the wearing of hijab as a cultural 
tradition rather than religious obligation. Hence, they have viewed Islam as an 
indispensable part of their country’s culture.  
Secondly, the rise of Islamo-democracy in Turkey has created a dilemma for 
some Central Asian regimes. While crushing hard-line Islamists from the IMU and 
Hizb ut-Tahrir can be easily justified, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Tajik authorities cannot 
afford to appear outright “anti-Islamist”. The three countries have joined the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and have aspired to improve economic and 
trade relations with Turkey, which is one of the biggest investors in Central Asia. For 
example, the Tajik president Emomali Rahmanov stated in 2007 that  
 
We attach great importance to our relations with Turkey, our brother. Our 
politics have always been based on this view and will continue to be so. 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-turkey-tensions-central-asia/27387987.html, 
accessed November 26, 2015. 
66 See Bayram Balci, “What Future For the Fethullah Gülen Movement in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus?”, July 2, 2014, At 
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67 On localization of norm see Amitav Achraya. 2004. “How Ideas Spread: Whose 
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International Organization 58 (Spring): 239-275. 
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However the current level of relations is not enough or satisfactory…we 
should accelerate Tajikistan-Turkey relations, particularly in social and 
economic fields.68  
             
                 Likewise, Kyrgyz politicians have stressed the importance of the Turkish 
model. Omurbek Tekebayev, Kyrgyzstan’s former parliament speaker and deputy 
prime minister, argued during a visit to Turkey in October 2010 that ‘Turkey’s 
parliamentary system proves that a modern democracy can be formed in the Turkic 
and the Islamic worlds’.69 Likewise, Kazakhstan’s president Nazarbayev has paid 
great attention to relations with Turkey; during a visit to Turkey in October 2012, he 
stated that ‘We have particular respect for Turkey which was the first country to 
recognize our independence. Today the Turkish Republic is one of the closest 
strategic partners of our country’.70  
In other words, Turkey is viewed by the three countries as strategic ally. But a 
more Islamic Turkey means that Central Asian regimes would have a difficulty to 
sustain their confrontational policy vis-à-vis radical Islamists. The existence of 
alternative pro-Islamist voices like Bakir Uulu, Tleukhan and Kabiri could protect 
regimes from criticism, while in reality rulers still control the role of Islam in public 
life. The declining state repression has created political space for newcomers to put 
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forward a political agenda that is Islam-based. However, the recent banning of the 
IRPT may eventually question the Tajik regime’s commitment to maintaining good 
relations with Turkey.   
 
Conclusion  
Political Islam has long been viewed by Central Asian leaders as a major 
threat to regional stability. Although jihadi and clandestine groups have made inroads, 
they are still marginal. Nevertheless, there is a new variant of political Islam. As 
opposed to the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir which seek to establish an Islamic state, the 
new Islamists of Central Asia seek a more public role for the Muslim faith without 
confronting state authorities. In effect, they have favoured a partial and soft 
Islamization of their respective societies. Their target audience is those devout 
Muslims who support a version of Islamism that emphasizes societal changes. 
The new generation of Islamists in the region does not favour a radical 
political change and seek to modify the system from within. The influence of Turkey 
on the new political Islam of Central Asia is substantial for two reasons. First, the 
norm of Islamic difference has been diffused from Turkey to Central Asian countries 
through different channels, ranging from media to education. Second, Central Asian 
regimes have tolerated the Islamo-democrats because they do not wish to antagonize a 
more Islamic Turkey which remains a strategic ally.  Bakir Uulu, Tleukhan and Kabiri 
are the new face of political Islam in Central Asia. 
 
Acknowledgement 
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for his/her comments. 
